Introduction
Because every kind of discrimination is antithetical to the European integration process, 1 the principle of nondiscrimination is deeply embedded in European Union law. Indeed, a large body of nondiscrimination law has been of age. In Maruko , it declared the disadvantaged treatment of same-sex life partners relative to spouses to be direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, thus ruling in favor of same-sex couples for the fi rst time (2). The public announcement of an employer that he will not employ people of a certain ethnic origin was classifi ed, in Feryn , as direct discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin regardless of whether a specifi c victim of discrimination could be identifi ed (3). Finally, in Coleman , the Court held that Directive 2000/78/EC 13 prohibits discrimination not only against people who bear a specifi c attribute themselves but also against those associated with someone who has a protected trait (4). Taken together, these decisions demonstrate the Court's inclination to extend protection against discrimination by interpreting the rules of nondiscrimination law expansively, thus giving them maximal effect. In Mangold , the Court had to deal with age discrimination, which is expressly prohibited in the November 2000 Framework Directive. Mr. Mangold, at the time aged fi fty-six, was employed on a fi xed-term basis in 2003 by Mr. Helm, who practiced law. In their contract of employment the parties justifi ed the fi xed-term clause by reference to the German Fixed-Term Employment Act, 14 under which such employment contracts are lawful 15 without further justifi cation if the employee is aged fi fty-two or more. Mr. Mangold brought proceedings before the national labor court claiming that the fi xed-term clause, although in conformity with national law, was incompatible with European law, in particular, with the Framework Directive. Consequently, the Munich Labor Court referred the question of how to interpret that directive to the ECJ. 14 § 14 Teilzeit-und Befristungsgesetz. 15 Under German Law, fi xed-term contracts without objective justifi cation are generally void, i.e., the contract becomes an employment contract of unlimited duration and, as such, is subject to the usual possibilities of terminating the contract and, in particular, to laws of employment protection. For details as to the German legal situation, see Mangold, supra note 9, ¶ ¶ 14 -19.
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After fi nding the order for reference admissible, 16 the Court considered the compatibility of the German statute with the Framework Directive 17 and concluded that it entailed a differential treatment on the basis of age, 18 which was not justifi ed under article 6(1) 19 of the directive. 20 Even though the legislative purpose of promoting the vocational integration of unemployed older workers was legitimate, 21 the Court concluded that the means used to achieve that objective went beyond what was appropriate and necessary. The Court based this fi nding mainly on the fact that the age of the worker was the only criterion used to justify the use of a fi xed-term contract; thus, the personal situation of the particular individual was not adequately acknowledged. 22 However, the period prescribed for the transposition of the directive into domestic law had not yet expired (at the time the contract was concluded) since Germany had availed itself of an option to defer this deadline. Therefore, because the Framework Directive could not be applied directly, 23 16 Admissibility had been questioned on grounds that the dispute in the main proceedings was fi ctitious or contrived, because Mangold's employer also had publicly argued that the German Fixed Term Employment Act was incompatible with EC law. However, the Court reasoned that the interpretation of Community Law was relevant for the outcome of the case pending before the national court and, therefore, that the parties ' agreement on the validity of the national law could not affect the existence of the dispute. ( Mangold, supra note 9, ¶ ¶ 32 -38) For a detailed discussion on the admissibility, cf. 17 The compatibility with Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fi xed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] O.J. (L175/43) (Framework Agreement), which is supposed " to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fi xed-term employment contracts, " has also been questioned. However, in the Court's opinion, the interpretation of the Framework Agreement was irrelevant to the outcome of the dispute, as no successive fi xed-term employment contract had been concluded (cf. Mangold, supra note 9, ¶ 43). 18 Mangold, supra note 9, ¶ 57. 19 Article 6 (1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC states: " Notwithstanding Article 2(2), Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justifi ed by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labor market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. " 20 Mangold, supra note 9, at ¶ 65. 21 Mangold, supra note 9 , at ¶ 59. 22 Mangold, supra note 9 , at ¶ 65. 23 35 which has been derived from article 141 EC (former article 119 EC) and its implementing legislation, is acknowledged as an independent principle, quite apart from the general principle of equality, 36 it is a signifi cant step further to infer from the latter the existence of a general principle specifi cally prohibiting age discrimination.
It is true that the general principle of equality implies, potentially, a prohibition of any discrimination on specifi c grounds. It is also true that any specifi c prohibition is an expression of that general principle. 37 However, neither article 13 EC nor the implementing directives necessarily refl ect a preexisting prohibition of all possible forms of discrimination. Rather, it is envisaged that the Community legislature and the member states may take appropriate action in this regard if they consider it necessary. 38 principle without a conclusive legal basis severely restricts the legislature's prerogative and discretion to shape the scope and the limits of European nondiscrimination law. 39 Now that the period for implementation has elapsed and all member states are bound by the Framework Directive, there is no question that the principle of nondiscrimination on the grounds of age is a general one. However, at the time of the Mangold decision, this was not the case. To base its fi nding, legally, on the existence of a general principle of prohibiting age discrimination, the Court should have shown in detail that such a principle actually existed at that time. 40 Be that as it may, it merely made a reference to the general principle of equality, which exists, obviously, though it is not identical to the specifi c prohibition of age discrimination.
The Court's position would have been strengthened if it had taken into account articles 21 and 25 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 41 as proof of the member states ' general wish to prohibit age discrimination. However, the charter was not, and still is not, binding law. 42 Moreover, merely because the Framework Directive was concluded unanimously does not, in itself, prove the existence of a general principle in that sense; by adopting the directive, the member states wished to be bound by its provisions after the implementation period has elapsed. There is no indication that they wished merely to affi rm an already binding principle. Even though age discrimination sometimes is considered in international law to fall under the rubric of discrimination on grounds of " other status, " 43 this does not raise the specifi c prohibition 39 Riesenhuber, supra note 29, at 68. In view of these considerations, the ECJ was rightly reproached for having exceeded its competence by contriving a general principle of Community law prohibiting the discrimination on the basis of age. 45 Nonetheless, the Court, once again, affi rmed the existence of such a general principle in its recent decision in Bartsch , 46 even though it denied its applicability to the instant case. 47 It held that the general principle must be applied where there is a link with Community law. While it is true that, in several other decisions in the fi eld of nondiscrimination law, the Court did not mention the existence of a general principle of nondiscrimination on specifi c grounds, 48 this was because such a reference was not necessary. 49 In those cases, the Court could rely directly on article 141 EC 50 or on the respective directives themselves, as the period for transposition of the directives had expired. 51 Certainly, in those decisions and, in particular, in Bartsch the ECJ had the chance to introduce the legal basis for a general principle of nondiscrimination on specifi c grounds by 44 dealing with the arguments raised by the critics of Mangold and by elaborating on the origin, scope, and contents of such a principle. 52 As this was not necessary for the judgment in the specifi c cases, 53 the Court refrained from doing so. Thus, one is left to conclude that, since Mangold , the ECJ acknowledges a general principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of age. Regardless of whether its derivation of that principle in Mangold is convincing or not, the Court's recognition has rendered the principle valid European law, especially since the member states have tacitly accepted this jurisprudence by not even discussing the inclusion of any provision to the contrary in the EC treaty.
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Since Mangold , the Court has not " detached " the principle of nondiscrimination from the existing directives, suggesting that, while it remains well disposed toward European nondiscrimination law, it does not lightly exceed its competence. 55 It seems, then, that the judgment in Mangold , while it did not herald the beginning of an " all-embracing European Anti-Discrimination law, " 56 nonetheless introduced a general principle with regard to age discrimination that enhanced European protection against discrimination. 52 (2008) . 53 In Bartsch, supra note 46, at ¶ 24, the Court held that there was no link with Community Law. For a discussion of this part of the judgment, see Preis & Temming, supra note 52. For the other cases, cf. supra notes 50 and 51. 54 The decision of the German Constitutional Court in the (pending) Honeywell Bremsbelag case (2 BvR 2661/06) will not infl uence the validity of the general principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of age. Should the German Constitutional Court follow the Mangold critics and argue that the ECJ exceeded its competences and that, therefore, the decision need not be observed ( cf . Temming, supra note 34, at 3404), its judgment would be contrary to European Community Law, especially to the principle of supremacy of Community Law over national ( see Case Maruko concerned discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, which is also expressly prohibited in the Framework Directive. The case concerned a homosexual man in a registered same-sex life partnership. After the death of his life partner, Mr. Maruko's application for a widower's pension was rejected by his partner's pension institution on the basis that only spouses were entitled to this benefi t. Mr. Maruko challenged this decision in a domestic court, arguing that it constituted discrimination on grounds of his sexual orientation. Because the Framework Directive prohibits such discrimination in the fi eld of employment, the court referred the matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. After explaining in detail 57 that the widower's pension should be classifi ed as pay within the meaning of article 3(1)(c) of the Framework Directive, the Court dealt rather tersely with the signifi cance of Recital 22 of the preamble to the directive, which states that the " Directive is without prejudice to national laws on marital status and the benefi ts dependent thereon. " The pension institution had deduced from this clause that the Framework Directive did not apply to provisions of national law relating to civil status or benefi ts accruing from that status, such as survivor's benefi ts. 58 However, the Court found that, although civil status and its benefi ts are matters falling within the competence of the member states, the latter must comply with Community law and, especially, with the principle of nondiscrimination when exercising that competence. Without addressing the general question of the signifi cance of preamble recitals, the Court concluded that Recital 22 could not affect the application of the directive. 59 The next issue before the Court was whether the rejection of Mr. Maruko's application violated the directive's prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. In light of the directive's purpose, which, according to article 1, is to combat certain forms of discrimination in the fi eld of employment and occupation, the Court reasoned that, if the situation of a surviving life partner is comparable with that of a spouse, the denial of a survivor's benefi t to life partners constitutes a direct discrimination within the meaning of articles 1 and 2(2)(a) of the Framework Directive. 60 The question of the comparability 57 Maruko , supra note 10, at ¶ ¶ 40 -56. 58 Maruko , supra note 10, at ¶ 39 (reiterating the arguments of the pension institution). For an argument in the same sense, see e.g., the German Constitutional Court, BVerfG (2 BvR 855/06), (decided Sep 20 2007), 61 N EUE J URISTISCHE W OCHENSCHRIFT , 213 (2008) . 59 Maruko , supra note 10, at ¶ ¶ 58/59. 60 Maruko , supra note 10, at ¶ ¶ 65 et seq. 
Discrimination against same-sex life partners as compared with spouses -discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation?
While the classifi cation of the widower's pension in question as " pay, " within the meaning of the directive, merely reaffi rmed previous case law, 62 the fi nding that the denial of a pension to a homosexual life partner can constitute direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation renders Maruko remarkable and, thus, much discussed. 63 Ten years earlier, in Grant v. South West Trains , 64 the Court had denied that a collective agreement refusing same-sex couples the benefi ts granted to heterosexual couples amounted to discrimination. However, this was before the adoption of the Framework Directive; thus, the claim for discrimination could only be based on article 141 EC concerning equal pay for men and women. The Court had held that the collective agreement was not discriminatory in the sense of article 141, since both male and female same-sex couples were denied the benefi t. This cautious approach by the ECJ toward the question of sexualorientation discrimination 65 can thus be explained by the legal situation at the time. 66 Now, however, in Maruko , the Court was guided by the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation expressly stated in the Framework Directive. According to that text, direct discrimination occurs when one of two persons in a comparable situation is treated less favorably than the other on grounds of religion, beliefs, disability, age, or sexual orientation. In contrast, indirect discrimination arises when an apparently neutral provision places persons having a certain religion, disability, age, or sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons. 67 Under the national rule 61 Maruko , supra note 10, at ¶ 73. in question, only an applicant who had been married to the deceased would be entitled to survivor's benefi ts. Accordingly, Mr. Maruko's pension, at fi rst glance, was denied on the basis of his civil status and not on any of the grounds prohibited by the directive. However, in general and in practice, it is heterosexuals who get married and homosexuals who establish registered partnerships. 68 Thus, making eligibility for a survivor's benefi t dependent on the civil status of being married is a distinction that could be defi ned as indirect discrimination based on sexual orientation.
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The ECJ takes a different view, regrettably without discussing the reasons for its ruling ; it simply states that where surviving spouses and surviving life partners are in comparable situations, the denial of a pension to the latter constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 70 There are two likely reasons for this conclusion.
First, the Court sought to render a decision that was " true-to-life " and " down-to-earth " 71 and that furthered the purpose of the directive. 72 It might have made its point clearer by remarking, explicitly, that neither registered heterosexual life partners nor homosexual spouses -despite their theoretical possibility 73 -occur all that often in real life. It is not a question of homosexuals being affected detrimentally in greater numbers than heterosexuals. In fact, it is only homosexuals who are surviving life partners and, thus, are denied the survivor's pension. Differentiations on grounds of having been married or having entered into a life partnership, therefore, exclusively affect people with a specifi c sexual orientation and, consequently, discriminate directly on grounds of it.
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This approach is not inconsistent with the Court's prior case law. In Schnorbus , 75 a woman had contested the possibility of " priority access " to practical legal training for those who had completed military service (or its civilian 68 Under the German Life-Partnership Law, it is possible for two homosexuals of the opposite gender to marry one another, or for two heterosexuals of the same gender to establish a registered life partnership, although neither is a loving couple (see also Mahlmann, supra note 63, at 319). When recognizing a marriage or a life partnership, the state does not inquire as to the motivation behind it. However, the Life-Partnership Law was designed to enable homosexual couples to enter into a life partnership. Thus, in fact, it is only homosexual men and women who fall under the scope of the Law on Registered Life Partnerships, whereas it is only heterosexual people who are married. 69 For this view, see German Constitutional Court supra note 58, at 210 and German Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG -6 C 27/06) (decided July 25 2007), 61 N EUE J URISTISCHE W OCHEN-SCHRIFT 247 (2008) . 70 Maruko , supra note 10, at ¶ 72. 71 In the same sense Mahlmann, supra note 63, at 319. 72 Maruko , supra note 10, at ¶ 65.
73 Supra note 68. 74 Mahlmann, supra note 63, at 319; Potz, supra note 63, at 408. at Vrije Universiteit Brussel on July 28, 2010 http://icon.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from equivalent) as direct discrimination on grounds of gender, since only men were obliged to perform this service in Germany. The Court held the national rule in question to be indirect discrimination because, besides the completion of military service, it provided for a number of other, different circumstances to be taken into account for priority access. Thus, in contrast with the situation in Maruko, in the Schnorbus decision women were also entitled, by law and in fact, to the favorable treatment.
Second, the assumption in Maruko of direct discrimination makes it impossible to justify differential treatment. The exceptions in articles 2(5), 76 4, 77 and 7 78 of the directive clearly do not apply; nor can any justifi cation for direct discrimination be found elsewhere in the text. 79 Indirect discrimination, by contrast, could be justifi ed if a legitimate state aim were pursued by appropriate and necessary means. 80 It has been argued that the special protection and advancement of marriage, stipulated in article 6 of the German Constitution, could be a legitimate aim that would be furthered by privileging spouses.
81 By considering the differentiation between spouses and life partners as direct discrimination, the ECJ avoided dealing with that argument, which, on closer examination, is hardly persuasive. To treat registered life partners less favorably than spouses does not further marriage, since under German law homosexual couples cannot choose between marriage and registered life partnership. No homosexual person is likely to choose marriage to a person of the opposite sex over entering into a registered life partnership with a same-sex partner in order to create the entitlement to a survivor's pension. 82 However, to classify the situation as direct discrimination leaves no room for justifi cation. Thus, the ECJ enhanced rights protection for homosexuals while avoiding direct confl ict with the German judiciary. Nonetheless, the ruling would have been judicially less contestable if the Court had examined and rejected the grounds that could be raised in justifying differential treatment of spouses and gay life partners.
The crucial question of whether the situations of spouses and life partners actually are comparable, in the sense of article 2(2)(a) of the Framework 76 " This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures laid down by national law which, in a democratic society, are necessary for public security, for the maintenance of public order and the prevention of criminal offences, for the protection of health and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. " Directive, is a question of national law; therefore, it was referred back to the national court. Nevertheless, albeit implicitly, the Court shows its presumption of comparability, 83 ruling, for the fi rst time, in favor of same-sex couples. 84 Of course, as long as the highest German courts continue to deny this comparability, 85 the signifi cance of the Maruko decision may be diminished, at least in Germany. However, the ECJ clarifi ed in Maruko that it was not marriage and life partnership, in general, but, rather, the situations of spouses and life partners with respect to the specifi c benefi t in question, that were to be compared. 86 Because, under German law, the duties to care for each other and to commit themselves, mutually, to a lifetime union are now identical for spouses and life partners, 87 the German courts no longer have grounds for refusing to align the benefi ts granted to respective survivors. In line with the ECJ's judgment, the referring national court in Maruko has concluded that these statuses are comparable so far as the granting of survivor's benefi ts are concerned. 88 It remains to be seen whether the higher courts will follow suit and do their part for nondiscrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.
Additionally, it is not only the assumption of direct discrimination that advances the protection of homosexuals but also the ECJ's fi nding that, although matters of civil status fall within the competence of the member states, they must adhere to European law when exercising that competence within the scope of the EC Treaty. 89 If the member states decide to introduce a special civil status for homosexual couples, 90 they must do so in conformity with the principle of nondiscrimination as contained in Directive 2000/78/EC and ensure that they are not discriminated against in the fi eld of employment.
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Thus, in Maruko , the ECJ contributed to the protection of homosexual men or women against discrimination, in good company with other international courts and human rights bodies. In Feryn , the ECJ had to deal with racial discrimination, which is expressly prohibited in Directive 2000/43/EC 93 (Race Directive). Mr. Feryn, the director of a Belgian company that installed safety doors, had made public statements to the effect that his business was planning to recruit fi tters but it could not employ " immigrants, " as its customers were reluctant to give them access to their private residences to perform the work. Consequently, the Belgian organization designated to promote equal treatment under article 13 of the Race Directive applied to the Belgian labor court for a fi nding that Feryn had a discriminatory recruitment policy. Because it did not claim or show that anyone had actually applied for a job and had not been employed because of his or her ethnic origin, the Belgian Labor Court asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling regarding the scope of direct discrimination in light of the public statements made by Feryn, the conditions of the reversal of the burden of proof for discrimination, and the kind of penalties to be imposed.
First, the Court concluded -again referring to the purpose of the directivethat direct discrimination can occur even when a specifi c victim cannot be identifi ed. 94 It held that the question of what constitutes direct discrimination must be distinguished from the question of who is entitled to bring a claim for 91 Bruns, supra note 62, at 1929. discrimination. 95 The public statement of an employer that he will not recruit employees of a certain national origin is likely to dissuade certain candidates from submitting their applications and, accordingly, to hinder their access to the labor market. Consequently, such a statement constitutes direct discrimination within the meaning of the Race Directive, regardless of who brings a claim. The ECJ concludes, furthermore that, under article 8(1) of the directive, a public statement of this kind can trigger a shift of the burden of proof such that it is for the employer to rebut the presumption that he has applied a directly discriminatory recruitment policy. As to the issue of which kind of sanctions may be appropriate, the decision draws on article 15 of the directive, reiterating that possible sanctions must be " effective, proportionate and dissuasive. " The Court held that when there is no identifi able victim, both a prohibitory injunction and the award of damages to the body bringing the claim may fulfi ll these criteria.
Direct discrimination without an identifi able victim?
The fi nding that a refusal to employ immigrants constitutes racial or ethnic discrimination within the meaning of the Race Directive is hardly surprising. However, that such discrimination can be inferred from an employer's public statement, where a specifi c victim cannot be identifi ed, shows the Court's willingness to interpret European nondiscrimination law widely in order to render it fully effective.
Under article 2(2)(a) of the Race Directive, direct discrimination occurs " where one person is treated less favorably than another . . . in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin. "
96 The wording of article 2, thus, seems to demand that a specifi c person has actually been discriminated against. The Court's reasoning, however, is centered on the directive's purpose, namely, to foster conditions for a socially inclusive labor market. 97 If people of a particular race are dissuaded from even applying for employment by the public statements of an employer, their access to the labor market is hindered and the market is not socially inclusive. Consequently, even potential applicants are protected by the principle of racial nondiscrimination contained in the Race Directive; thus, even hypothetical acts of discrimination are prohibited. 98 The European Court of Justice thus has broadened the scope of the protection against discrimination from a subjective right of a specifi c person to 95 Feryn, supra note 11, at ¶ ¶ 26/27. 99 In this sense the principle of nondiscrimination serves not only the protection of individuals but also the creation of a nondiscriminatory society.
With respect to the purpose of the directive and the result achieved, the Court's decision is convincing. However, it did not address two important issues raised by the case. 100 First, the ECJ, as opposed to its advocate general, did not deal with the question of whether it matters that the discrimination took place because of Mr. Feryn's customers ' preferences. One may conclude that the Court found it absurd to justify an instance of discrimination by referring to the discriminatory wishes of one's customers, as this would amount to justifying racial discrimination with racism.
Second, the Court, like the advocate general, 101 did not discuss the extent to which the employer, when publicly making discriminatory statements, can rely on his fundamental right of freedom of expression, which is protected under European law. 102 According to settled case law, the exercise of this freedom may be restricted, provided that the restriction proportionately serves objectives of general interest. 103 Clearly, the principles of equality and nondiscrimination are in the general interest and of special importance within Community law. Since, these prevail, when balanced with freedom of expression, a reliance on freedom of expression would not have produced a different result. Nonetheless, the Court's decision would be less contestable had it disposed of these two issues and rebutted, at least briefl y, the potential arguments. However, this omission does not diminish the importance of the Court's fi nding that hypothetical discrimination lies within the scope of the directive. Clearly, this line of reasoning is applicable with respect to other grounds of discrimination; thus, public statements of unwillingness to employ women, homosexuals, or people of a certain religion would be equally liable to sanction. Thus the not only to protect disabled people but also to combat all forms of discrimination " on grounds " of disability in the fi eld of employment. The principle of equal treatment as contained in the directive, therefore, does not apply to a particular category of persons but by reference to the grounds mentioned in article 1. Consequently, employees who are not disabled but who are discriminated against because of the disability of a person connected with them fall within the personal scope of the directive. In the ECJ's opinion, even the provisions, which are designed to accommodate the needs of disabled people, 108 do not limit the personal scope of the directive or require its restrictive interpretation. 109 In the Court's view, such a broad interpretation of the personal scope of the directive does not confl ict with its own prior judgment in Chacon Navas. 110 In that case, which concerned the question of whether HIV should be considered a disability in the sense of the directive, the ECJ had stressed that the scope of the Framework Directive could not be extended beyond the grounds listed exhaustively in article 1. However, the Court now clarifi es that it did not intend for the directive's scope rationae personae to be interpreted strictly with regard to those grounds. 111 An interpretation of the Framework Directive " limiting its application only to people who are themselves disabled is liable to deprive that directive of an important element of its effectiveness and to reduce the protection which it is intended to guarantee. " Again, the primary argument of the ECJ was the desire to render the principle of nondiscrimination fully effective. For the fi rst time, the Court recognized as a matter of European law the existence of a concept of " discrimination by association. " 113 Such is said to occur when a person is treated detrimentally because of his or her connection with someone possessing a protected attribute. 114 general, and the Framework Directive, in particular. 115 Even though the instant judgment was delivered with respect to disability only, the underlying rationale is applicable across the range of prohibited grounds contained in the Framework Directive. 116 Due to the identical formulation of the relevant directives, this clearly applies to gender 117 and race 118 discrimination as well. 119 However, two questions remain: fi rst, what must be the nature of the association between the victim of discrimination and the person with the protected attribute for the protection to be extended? Although the advocate general argued that " discrimination by association " 120 is prohibited by the directive, the Court reasoned, merely, that the discrimination was based on the " child's disability. "
121 However, this should not be understood as restricting the protection of the antidiscrimination directives to situations in which parents are discriminated against, since the Court's central argument applies equally to other close relationships, such as those between spouses, life partners, or siblings. For now, it must be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether the relationship is suffi ciently close. 122 Second, the Court's judgment does not resolve the issue of whether indirect discrimination by association is also prohibited. 123 With respect to indirect discrimination by association, the wording of the directives is clear; indirect discrimination, as defi ned in article 2(2)(b) of the Framework Directive, occurs where an apparently neutral provision would put " persons having a particular
